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SOUTH AFRICAN COMPREHENSIVE ASSESSMENT INSTITUTE  
 SUID-AFRIKAANSE KOMPREENSIEWE ASSESSERINGSINSTITUUT

## SECTION A

### QUESTION 1: WHY DID THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA AND THE USSR COMPETE FOR EUROPEAN DOMINATION AFTER 1945?

#### SOURCE 1A

The extract is taken from *US History Pre-Colombia to the New Millenium, 52c Containment and the Marshall Plan* and outlines why the European Recovery Programme was implemented in Europe after 1945.

In the aftermath (outcome) of World War II, Western Europe lay devastated. The war had ruined crop fields and destroyed infrastructure, leaving most of Europe in dire (desperate) need. On 5 June 1947, the Secretary of State, George Marshall announced the European Recovery Programme. To avoid antagonizing (provoking) the Soviet Union, Marshall announced that the purpose of sending aid to Western Europe was completely humanitarian, and even offered aid to the communist states in the east. Congress approved Truman's request of 17 billion dollars over 4 years to be sent to Great Britain, France, West Germany, Italy, the Netherlands and Belgium.

The Marshall Plan created an economic miracle in Western Europe. By the target date of the programme, four years later, Western European industries were producing twice as much as they had the year before the war broke out. Some Americans grumbled (complained) about the costs, but the nation spent more on liquor during the years of the Marshall Plan than they sent overseas to Europe. The aid also produced record levels of trade with the American firms, fueling a post-war economic boom in the United States.

Lastly, and much to Truman's delight, none of these nations of Western Europe faced a serious threat of communist takeover for the duration of the Cold War.

[Source: <http://www.ushistory.org/us/52c.asp>. Accessed on 26 December 2023.]

## SOURCE 1B

This is an extract taken from a report, *Historical events in the European Integration Process (1945–2009)*. It focuses on economic cooperation between Belgium, the Netherlands and Luxembourg (Benelux) which was negotiated during World War II and continued after the introduction of the Marshall Plan.

Of all the organizations for economic cooperation created in the post-war period, Benelux is considered a precursor (forerunner) and a proving ground. The transitional Netherlands-Belgium-Luxembourg Customs Convention was signed on 5 September 1944 by the three governments-in-exile in London. It followed the Benelux monetary agreement of 21 October 1943, which fixed exchange rates between the Belgian-Luxembourg franc and the Dutch guilder.

The Customs Convention established a tariff community between the three countries and provided for the subsequent creation of an economic union to foster economies of scale.

The Convention also introduced a common external customs tariff and eliminated customs duties on trade within Benelux, but it maintained other protectionist barriers, such as quotas, levies, etc.

Economic union was to be achieved in three successive stages: the unification of customs duties; the unification of excise duties, transfer tax and customs legislation; and, in the longer term, an economic union.

The Benelux Convention provided for the creation of an Administrative Council for Customs, a Council for Trade Agreements and a Council of the Economic Union.

Through this agreement, the three countries were not so much trying to achieve complete economic integration as to strengthen their position as small states under threat on the international stage, in particular at a time when the multilateral monetary agreements were being negotiated at Bretton Woods.

On 1 January 1948, the Benelux Customs Union became operative. In a very difficult post-war economic climate, the Benelux conventions offered barrier-free trade to the three signatories. But implementing the conventions was not always easy. Difficulties arose between the three governments, notably because of their conflicting opinions on European cooperation, their attitudes towards Germany and the use of aid made available by the Marshall Plan. The delicate negotiations between the three partners highlighted the difficulties involved in forging an economic union between states that, in the aftermath of the war, had diverse economic structures and national interests.

[Source: <https://www.cvce/en/education/unit-content/02bb76df-d066-4c08-a58ad4686ff>. Accessed on 8 June 2024.]

**SOURCE 1C**

This extract from an article *Cold War – The 1945-1989*, by E.G. Rayner covers the conference of the COMINFORM that was held in 1947. It highlights how the Soviet Union viewed the Marshall Plan.

The ruling clique (Allies) of American imperialists, has chosen the path of hatching the new war plans against the Soviet Union and the new democracies... The clearest and most specific expression of the policy is provided by the Truman-Marshall plans. [With regard to] such countries as Yugoslavia and Poland, the United States and Great Britain are pursuing a terrorist policy ... Imitating the Hitlerites, the new aggressors, are using blackmail and extortion (fraud).

On 22 September 1947, delegates from the Communist Parties of the Soviet Union, gathered near Warsaw and created the Cominform, an information bureau located near Belgrade. It quickly became the Communist Movement's agent for spreading its ideology through its newspaper, *For a lasting peace, for a people's democracy*. Presented as a revival of the Comintern, the Cominform actually served as an instrument for the USSR to keep close control over western Communist Parties. The aim was to close ranks around Moscow and to ensure that European Communists were in line with Soviet policies. Tito's Yugoslavia, accused of deviationism, would soon be excluded from the Cominform.


Then in January 1949, in response to the Marshall Plan, the USSR created a programme of economic cooperation with the Soviet bloc countries known as the Council for Mutual Economic Assistance (COMECON).

[Source: <http://www.evee.eu/obj/the-cold-war1945-1989-full-text-en-6dfe06ed-47948a4-8968-855e90593185.html>.  
Accessed on 15 February 2024]




### SOURCE 1D

This cartoon was published in the *Krokodil*, a Soviet magazine, in 1948. It depicts the effect of the Marshall Plan.



[Source: [www.jhnclare.riet/cold-war8.htm](http://www.jhnclare.riet/cold-war8.htm). Accessed on 23 September 2013.]



## QUESTION 2: HOW DID THE BATTLE OF CUITO CUANAVALÉ IMPACT THE OUTCOME OF THE ANGOLAN WAR BETWEEN 1987 AND 1988?

### SOURCE 2A

The extract below describes the involvement of Angola, Cuba, South Africa and the Soviet Union in the Battle of Cuito Cuanavale that was fought between 1987 and 1988. The information is taken from *South Africa in the 20<sup>th</sup> Century* by B.J. Liebenberg *et al.*

The Battle of Cuito Cuanavale was fought intermittently between 14 August 1987 and 23 March 1988, south and east of the town of Cuito Cuanavale, Angola, by the People's Armed Forces for the Liberation of Angola (FAPLA) and advisors and soldiers from Cuba, USSR, Vietnam, ANC and SWAPO against South Africa, and soldiers of the National Union for the Total Independence of Angola (UNITA) during the Angolan Civil War and South African Border War. The battle was the largest engagement of the Angolan conflict and the biggest conventional battle on the African continent since World War II. UNITA and its South African allies defeated a major FAPLA offensive towards Mavinga, preserving the former's control of southern Angola. They proceeded to launch a failed counteroffensive on FAPLA defensive positions around the Tumpo River east of Cuito Cuanavale.

South Africa, which shared a common border with Angola through the contested territory of South West Africa (Namibia), was then determined to prevent FAPLA from gaining control of Mavinga and allowing insurgents of the People's Liberation Army of Namibia (PLAN) to operate in the region. Aludando Octubre prompted the South African Defence Force (SADF) to underpin the defence of Mavinga and launch *Operation Moduler* with the objective of stopping FAPLA's advance. After weeks of preliminary skirmishes, the two armies met at the Lomba River on 6 September. Throughout September and October, the SADF repulsed (drive back) several FAPLA attempts to cross the Lomba and destroyed most of the latter's vital bridging equipment. Repeated counterattacks by the SADF's 61 Mechanised Battalion Group resulted in the annihilation (complete destruction) of FAPLA's 47 Brigade and the loss of its remaining bridgeheads, sending the remainder of the FAPLA units reeling back towards Cuito Cuanavale.

[Source: *South Africa in the 20<sup>th</sup> Century*, by B.J. Liebenberg *et al.*]

**SOURCE 2B**

The table below is taken from *The SADF in the Border War* by L. Scholtz. It shows the losses by the SADF during the Battle of Cuito Cuanavale. These were the official figures recorded by the SADF and do not include UNITA losses.

<b>MILITARY EQUIPMENT DESTROYED AND SOLDIERS KILLED</b>	<b>CUBAN/FAPLA LOSSES (1987–1988)</b>	<b>SADF LOSSES</b>
Tanks	94	3
Armoured vehicles	100	11
Rocket launchers	34	0
Logistical vehicles	389	0
Helicopters	9	0
Men killed	4 785	32

[Source: *The SADF in the Border War* by L. Scholtz. Accessed on 17 July 2024]

## SOURCE 2C

The extract below outlines General Jannie Geldenhuys, Commander of the SADF's account of the South African Defence Force's involvement in the Battle of Cuito Cuanavale. It is taken from *War for Africa, Twelve Months that Transformed the Continent* by Fred Bridgland.

General Geldenhuys said that the South African Defence Force (SADF) had strictly limited objectives when its forces became substantially engaged with UNITA in southeastern Angola, in July 1987. "It was not our intention to start a war that might end in Luanda and go on forever. We did not want to make Angola our Vietnam. Our aim after crossing into Angola, was to achieve certain limited tasks and then, get out."

Geldenhuys denied that Cuito Cuanavale was ever an objective of strategic importance for the SADF. "Cuito Cuanavale was put into the limelight by the Cubans. I actually forbade the Chief of the army [Kat Liebenberg] to take Cuito Cuanavale. I made just one concession: If our operation so developed that Cuito Cuanavale fell into our lap, and we capture it, without fighting for it, then our troops could occupy it."

Additionally, we have to be sure we would be able to defend it, because there is no point in capturing a place, if you cannot hold it.

Geldenhuys said there are several ways in which to argue about who won the war for Africa. The best way was to look at the initial objective of each side. "The Cuban FAPLA objective was to capture Mavinga and Jamba. They did not accomplish it. Our objective was to prevent them from taking Mavinga and Jamba. We succeeded."

[Source: War for Africa – Twelve Months that Transformed a Continent by F. Bridgland]

## SOURCE 2D

The extract below was taken from the article, *The significance of The Battle of Cuito Cuanavale: Long-term Foresight for the Current Strategic Landscape* by Andreas Velthuisen. It focuses on the importance of the Battle of Cuito Cuanavale.

For analytical purposes, the course of the Battle for Cuito Cuanavale can be divided into three stages:

- The Angolan offensive and South African intervention.
- The escalation of the conflict by South Africa and subsequent Cuban escalation; and
- The strategic impasse (a situation in which no progress is possible) that paved the way to for peace.

On 1 May 1987, after the Angolan government offensive was confirmed, it was decided by Chief of the South African Defence Force to deploy two liaison teams from the South African Military Intelligence Division east of Cuito Cuanavale to assess the situation together with UNITA. Involvement by the SADF was to remain clandestine with the main responsibility of stopping the offensive still resting with UNITA. The SADF nevertheless prepared for air and ground attacks on FAPLA while the latter was on the march. On 22 June 1987, the South West African Territory Force (SWATF) was ordered to support UNITA in halting the offensive. Operation MODULER was to be conducted in escalating phases. By mid-August 1987, it was clear that the force levels were inadequate if the stated aims were to be achieved. The FAPLA offensive on the different fronts continued. On 28 August, at Mavinga, the UNITA leader, Jonas Savimbi, admitted that UNITA had no prospect of stopping the offensive on its own, and requested South Africa to increase its aid. He also agreed that UNITA would deploy the Stinger anti-aircraft missiles obtained from the USA to protect the South African artillery. Restrictions on air support by the SA Air Force were also lifted and 61 Mechanised Battalion of the SADF was placed on alert at Oshivello in Namibia.

[Source: The significance of The Battle of Cuito Cuanavale: Long-term Foresight, by Andreas Velthuisen]

**QUESTION 3: HOW DID THE CONSERVATIVE WHITE AMERICANS RESPOND TO THE INTEGRATION OF CENTRAL HIGH SCHOOL IN LITTLE ROCK, ARKANSAS, IN 1957?****SOURCE 3A**

This source is about integration at Central High School, Little Rock, Arkansas. It outlines how the Little Rock Nine from Arkansas were recruited as the first African American students to attend this school in September 1957. They were prepared and orientated for school integration by Daisy Bates, the President of the National Association for the Advancement of Colored People (NAACP).

Despite the opposition, nine students registered to be the first African Americans to attend Central High School. Minnijean Brown, Elizabeth Eckford, Ernest Green, Thelma Mothershed, Melba Patillo, Gloria Ray, Terrence Roberts, Jefferson Thomas and Carlotta Walls had been recruited by Daisy Bates, president of the Arkansas NAACP and co-publisher, with her husband, LC Bates, of the Arkansas State Press, an influential African American newspaper.

Daisy Bates and the others from the Arkansas NAACP carefully vetted (evaluated) the group of students and determined if they all possessed the strength and determination to face the resistance they would encounter.

In the weeks prior to the start of the new school year, the students participated in intensive counselling sessions, guiding them on what to expect once classes began, and how to respond to anticipated hostile (unfriendly) situations. The group came to be known as the Little Rock Nine.

[Source: <http://www.history.com/topics/black-history/central-high-school-integration>. Accessed on 11 January 2024.]

**SOURCE 3B**

This is an extract from the speech that the Governor of Arkansas, Orval Faubus, delivered on 2 September 1957. He told the people of Arkansas how he felt about the closing of public schools in Little Rock, Arkansas.

“We are now faced with a far different problem, and that is the forcible integration of the public schools of Little Rock against the overwhelming sentiment (feeling) of the people of the area. This problem gives every evidence and indication that the attempt to integrate forcibly will bring about widespread disorder and violence.

There is another aspect which I must recognize, and that is the fact that this particular problem and its solution is not only statewide, but nationwide in scope. This, of course, is most unfortunate, but is a situation not of my making.”

The plan of integration now being forced upon us by the federal courts was set up by the Little Rock School Board and its superintendent (manager) and approved by a federal court prior to expressions of the people, which had been manifest (clear) since that time. These expressions of the people have been clearly indicated by the greatest, time-honored principles of democracy, by the exercise of the franchise (right) of the ballot box, and the expressions of the members of the legislature who are elected by and are representative of the people.

[Source: The Orval Eugene Faubus Papers, Special Collections, University of Arkansas.]

**SOURCE 3C**

This extract taken from *The Long Shadow* by D. Bates focuses on an interview that Daisy Bates conducted with Dr Benjamin Fine, former education editor of *The New York Times*. He gave an account of what happened on the first day of integration at Central High School, 4 September 1957.

A few days after the (Arkansas) National Guard blocked the negro\* (African-American) children's entrance to the school, Ben showed up at my house.

"Daisy, they spat at my face. I have been a marked man ever since Elizabeth tried to enter Central. I never told you what happened that day. I tried not to think about it. Maybe I was ashamed to admit to you or to myself that white men and women could be so cruel."

I was standing in front of the school that day. Suddenly there was a shout: "They're here!"

"The niggers\* are coming!" I saw a sweet little girl who looked about fifteen, walking alone. She tried several times to pass through the guards. The last time she tried, they put their bayonets (sharp knife attached to the barrel of a rifle) in front of her. The women were shouting, "Get her! Lynch her!" The men were yelling, "Go home ...". She finally made it to the bus stop. I sat down beside her and said, "I'm a reporter from the *New York Times*, may I have your name?" She just sat there with her head down. Tears were streaming down her cheeks from under her sunglasses. Daisy, I don't know what made me to put my arm around her, lifting her chin, saying, "Don't let them see you cry."

There must have been five hundred around us by this time. I vaguely remember someone hollering (shouting), "Get a rope and drag her over to the tree."

"The irony of it all, Daisy, is that during all this time the National Guardsmen made no effort to protect Elizabeth or to help me. Instead, they threatened to have me arrested for inciting the riot."

"Elizabeth, whose dignity and control in the face of jeering mobsters had been filmed by television cameras and recorded on pictures flashed to newspapers over the world, had overnight become a national heroine. During the next few days newspaper reporters besieged (surrounded) her house, wanting to talk to her."

[Source: *The Long Shadow of Little Rock*, by D. Bates.]

\* Nigger/Negro: A derogatory (offensive) term used to refer to African-Americans



### SOURCE 3D

The source below was designed and distributed by the Capital Citizens Council (CCC), an organisation established by conservative white Americans who lived in Little Rock, Arkansas. Their aim was to oppose the integration of Central High School in 1957.



[Source: <http://www.encyclopediaofarkansas.net/encyclopedia/entrydetail.aspx?entryID18#>. Accessed on 11 January 2024]

National Guardsmen that were deployed by President Eisenhower in 1957



## ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS

Visual sources and other historical evidence were taken from the following:

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